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Abstract 
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smaller impact on true inequality, approximated by consumption-based measures of Gini.  We 
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tax policies.  The Kuznets hypothesis is also supported by the estimates. 
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1.  Introduction 
That personal income tax structures contain a trade-off between efficiency and equity is 
considered conventional wisdom in the public finance literature (Ramsey 1927 and Mirrlees 
1971).  It is commonly believed that efficiency is best achieved by the use of simple lump sum 
taxes that do not distort the choices that people make, whereas vertical equity generally requires 
progressive tax schedules accompanied by individual specific deductions, allowances, and 
credits, which are distortionary.  As such, taxes that are efficient are thought to reduce equity and 
vice versa.   
But are these two objectives always in conflict?  Underlying this tradeoff is the 
presumption that a higher level of tax progressivity reduces income inequality.  However, the 
presence of tax evasion undermines this commonly held view of progressivity.  To the extent that 
tax rates and evasion are positively related, it is possible that both efficiency and equity are 
reduced as a result of increased progressivity.  This possibility follows if progressivity has a 
differential effect on observed inequality in reported income vs. actual inequality in true income 
in the presence of tax evasion.  
  In this paper, we seek to determine, theoretically and empirically, the relationship 
between structural progressivity of personal income taxes1 and income inequality, with a special 
emphasis on the differential effect of progressivity on observed vs. actual inequality.  Although a 
lot of work has been done to assess the impact of tax reforms on equity, this is the first known 
attempt to differentiate between these two effects.  Verification of this possible differential effect 
is becoming increasingly important given the number of countries that have or are considering 
the implementation of tax reforms with tax structures much flatter than their predecessors.  
Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2008) shows that personal income tax (PIT) structures 
                                                 
1 The term structural progressivity denotes changes in the average tax rate along the income distribution. 
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today have fewer tax brackets, lower top statutory marginal tax rates and reduced complexity 
than 25 years ago.  They also identify what appears to be a shift towards flat rate income taxes.  
By 2008, 21 countries adopted the flat rate PIT schedule and many more countries are seriously 
considering this policy.  If progressivity and income inequality are negatively related, then there 
are important implications of such policies for the distribution of income.  Given the tax evasion 
argument, however, it is not clear that shifting to flat taxes – or more generally, to income tax 
structures with lower levels of progressivity – will necessarily lead to greater levels of income 
inequality.   
Another important contribution of this paper is that we use a unique dataset for a large 
panel of countries that contains time-varying country-specific measures of structural 
progressivity of national personal income tax systems over the period 1981-2005.  We develop 
and estimate several measures of structural progressivity for over one hundred countries 
worldwide by using complete national income tax schedules with statutory rates, thresholds, 
country-specific tax formulas and other information.  The measures are based on data definitions 
that are compatible across countries as well as over time.  This dataset allows our analysis to be 
different than most of the previous work, which has been country-specific incidence studies that 
rely on micro-simulation exercises or computable general equilibrium models (Gravelle 1992 
and Martinez-Vazquez 2008).  
We do acknowledge that macro analysis has certain limitations as we are not able to 
examine within country heterogeneity in individual responses or directly estimate the tax evasion 
effect on income inequality.  We also cannot account for the possible offsetting effects of other 
taxes.2  Nevertheless, macro data provide an exceptional opportunity for examining the 
                                                 
2 It is important to emphasize that we focus on the personal income tax only.  As such, any equity offsets that may 
come from other taxes such as the corporate income tax or sales taxes are not taken into account.  In principle, 
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relationship between structural progressivity and income inequality on a large international scale 
and for cross-country comparisons in testing several important hypotheses. 
The key prediction of our theoretical framework is that progressivity affects observed 
inequality differently than it does true inequality, and that the difference between the two 
inequality effects is increasing with the extent of tax evasion and its responsiveness to tax 
changes.  To test this hypothesis, we use a country-level dataset of Gini coefficients calculated 
separately for gross income, net income, and consumption.  We argue that the consumption-
based measure of income is closer to true permanent income in comparison to disposable income 
reported in the household surveys.3  Our empirical analysis reveals that while progressivity 
reduces observed inequality in reported gross and net income, it has a significantly smaller 
impact on inequality in consumption.  We theorize that the positive effect of progressivity on 
true inequality is plausible, especially in the presence of weak legal institutions that can trigger a 
very large tax evasion response.  The evidence provides some support for our hypothesis as we 
show that weaker law and order produce a positive effect on inequality in consumption.  As 
expected, we find that progressivity has a larger negative effect on net income inequality than on 
gross income inequality.  
This paper also contributes to the testing of two additional hypotheses.  One hypothesis is 
an inverted U-shape relationship between income inequality and growth, known as the Kuznets 
hypothesis.  According to Kuznets (1955), this relationship is driven by changes that take place 
in the allocation of resources as the economy expands.  Our results are consistent with this 
hypothesis.  Another hypothesis, derived from the median voter theorem is that democracy and 
                                                                                                                                                             
policy makers could achieve the same level of income inequality by substituting reduced progressivity of the 
personal income tax with increased progressivity of the corporate tax.   
3 The empirical micro literature on developing countries has long pointed out the unreliability of income measures in 
household budget surveys due to widespread under-reporting and called for the use of consumption-based measures 
of inequality (e.g., Deaton 1997, Milanovic 1999). 
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income inequality should be negatively related.  While we do not test this hypothesis directly, we 
do show that progressivity tends to have a larger equalizing effect in societies that are more 
democratic.  We argue that this reinforcing effect works via larger redistribution which is 
brought about by the median voter in democratic societies.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework. Following 
that is a description of the data in section 3, the empirical model and results in section 4 and the 
conclusion in section 5.  
2.  The Relationship between Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality 
Progressive taxes are often designed to collect a greater proportion of income from the 
rich relative to the poor, thus reducing the inequality of disposable income relative to taxable 
income.  However, as the government increases structural progressivity or tax rates facing the 
rich, individuals may respond by taking steps to reduce their taxable income.  Reducing taxable 
income is achieved by either working less (productivity response) or simply reporting a smaller 
share of true income (tax evasion/avoidance response).  While both behavioral responses are 
likely to reduce observed income inequality, they can have a differential effect on true income 
inequality.  That is, though we expect the productivity response from more progressive taxes to 
reduce true inequality, the evasion response may increase true disposable income of the rich 
(since no taxes are paid on the hidden income) and thus increase inequality in true net income.   
The existing estimates of the productivity response based on the labor supply elasticity 
with respect to tax changes are rather modest (Eissa and Liebman 1996 and Blundell, Duncan, 
and Meghir 1998).  However, they may well be understated as they do not account for other 
forms of productivity adjustment such as response in efforts, occupational mobility, job 
reallocation, etc.  Another common measure, the elasticity of taxable income, is not a suitable 
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statistic to assess the productivity response as it also blends in the tax evasion response (Chetty 
2008).  Recently, Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter (2008; GMP) 
propose to use consumption data to measure the productivity response to tax changes; they find a 
relatively small growth in consumption of wealthier households that faced smaller tax rates after 
the 2001 Russian flat rate income tax reform.  At the same time, they estimate a significant 
increase in reported income (5 to 10 times larger than the consumption increase net of windfall 
gains), attributing the difference to improved tax compliance of households in the upper tax 
brackets.  It has also been argued, in earlier studies, that the evasion/avoidance effect is much 
stronger in the upper tail of the income distribution (Slemrod 1994 and Feldstein 1995).  In other 
words, the rich tend to be more sensitive to changes in the tax rates because they are better able 
to hide their income.4   
If the tax evasion response is indeed large, then the negative effect of higher and more 
progressive taxes on observed income inequality will significantly overstate (in absolute terms) 
their effect on the true distribution.  Below we illustrate these possibilities more formally using 
the Kuznets ratio as a measure of inequality.  We first model the effect of tax progressivity on 
observed income inequality and then on true income inequality.  
2.1. Inequality in Observed Income 
In this subsection, we outline a simple theoretical framework that demonstrates the effect 
of structural progressivity on observed income inequality.  Suppose we have two groups of 
individuals: r=rich and p=poor.  Let ܫ௬଴ be observed income inequality in disposable income 
between rich and poor, measured as the Kuznets ratio, which is the ratio of income received by 
                                                 
4 A well documented result in the tax evasion literature is that compliance is highest among individuals whose 
income is easily verified by tax authorities.  For example, wages can be more easily verified due to withholding.  It 
is also generally accepted that wages as a share of total income decline as income increases.  In other words, the rich 
has less verifiable income than the poor, and consequently they have more opportunities to hide their income. 
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the rich relative to that received by the poor.  We can write the Kuznets measure of observed 
inequality in disposable income as:  
ܫ௬଴ ൌ
௬ೝ೚
௬೛
೚ାீ
ൌ ௒ೝ
೚ሺଵିఛೝሻ
௒೛
೚൫ଵିఛ೛൯ାఏሺఛೝ௒ೝ
೚ሻ
, (1) 
where ܻ௢ is observed gross earned income reported for tax purposes, y0 is observed earned 
income net of tax, τ is the average tax rate, and G is non-taxable government transfers.  For 
simplicity of exposition, we assume that transfers are exclusively from rich to poor, and that they 
comprise a fixed portion θ of revenues collected from rich.  Equation (1) allows redistribution 
through transfers to be either pro-poor (0<θ<1) or neutral (θ=0).  We also note that observed 
gross income can be written as the difference between the true income Y* and unreported, hidden 
income YH, ௥ܻ௢ ൌ ௥ܻכ െ ௥ܻு for rich and ௣ܻ௢ ൌ ௣ܻכ െ ௣ܻு for poor. 
 Holding the tax rate facing the poor constant, ߬௥ becomes an indicator of structural tax 
progressivity.  Changes in structural progressivity create a likely negative productivity response 
on the part of the rich, డ௒ೝ
כ
డఛೝ
൏ 0.  This assumption follows from the earlier discussion and is 
supported by numerous studies of labor supply elasticities with respect to tax changes (e.g., 
Kumar 2008 and references therein).  Since the average tax rate facing the poor doesn’t change, 
we assume no behavioral response for the poor.5  If tax rates and hidden income of the rich are 
positively related, డ௒ೝ
ಹ
డఛೝ
൐ 0,6 then the partial derivative of ܫ௒଴ with respect to ߬௥ is unambiguously 
negative, 
                                                 
5 In reality, a small negative productivity effect might exist for the poor because of the positive income effect from 
government transfers which reduces work incentives. 
6 A majority of empirical studies find evidence of a positive relationship between tax rates and tax evasion (e.g., 
Clotfelter 1983, Slemrod 1985, GMP 2008).  Feinsten (1991) is a notable exception.  Although the early expected 
utility theoretical models produce ambiguous results that depend on assumptions made about risk aversion and the 
structure of penalties (Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Yitzhaki 1974), more recently, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) 
argue that prospect theory might be a better alternative to expected utility models and derive an unambiguous 
positive relationship between tax rates and tax evasion.   
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డூ೤బ
డఛೝ
ൌ
ൣ௬೛೚ାீ൧൤
ങೊೝ
బ
ങഓೝ
ሺଵିఛೝሻି௒ೝ೚൨ –ఏ௒ೝ೚ሺଵିఛೝሻ൤ఛೝ
ങೊೝ
బ
ങഓೝ
ା௒ೝ೚൨ 
൫௬೛
೚ାீ൯
మ   
ൌ
௬೛೚൤ି௒ೝ೚ା
ങೊೝ
బ
ങഓೝ
ሺଵିఛೝሻ൨ିఏሺ௒ೝ೚ሻమ
൫௬೛
೚ାீ൯
మ   
ൌ െܣ ௥ܻ௢ᇣᇤᇥ
ௗ௜௥௘௖௧
௘௙௙௘௖௧ழ଴
൅ ܣሺ1 െ ߬௥ሻ
డ௒ೝכ
డఛೝᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௣௥௢ௗ௨௖௧௜௩௜௧௬
௘௙௙௘௖௧ழ଴
െܣሺ1 െ ߬௥ሻ
డ௒ೝಹ
డఛೝᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௧௔௫ ௘௩௔௦௜௢௡
௘௙௙௘௖௧ழ଴
െ ఏ
ሺ௒ೝ೚ሻమ
൫௬೛
೚ାீ൯
మ
ᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
൏ 0
௥௘ௗ௜௦௧௥௜௕௨௧௜௢௡
௘௙௙௘௖௧ழ଴
, (2) 
where ܣ ൌ ௬೛
೚
൫௬೛
೚ାீ൯
మ.  The first term in equation (2) shows the direct effect of tax progressivity on 
income inequality in the absence of behavioral responses and subsequent redistribution from rich 
to poor.  The negative direct effect arises simply from the fact that a progressive tax structure 
imposes a higher tax burden on the rich. 
Equation (2) hints that the response of true and observed inequality to tax changes is 
likely to be different.  If the rich have greater access to the various means of hiding their income, 
they are likely to report a relatively smaller share of their income as structural progressivity 
increases, which will give the false impression that the distribution of income is becoming more 
equal.  As shown below, however, the distribution of true income may not improve. 
The last term in equation (2) shows the negative redistribution effect through transfers to 
poor.  If the government succeeds in redistributing the collected revenues in a pro-poor or neutral 
manner, then the higher tax on the rich is likely to reduce observed income inequality, ceteris 
paribus.  On the other hand, if redistribution through transfers is pro-rich, then the effect of 
structural progressivity on observed income inequality becomes ambiguous.   
Thus, the negative direct effect of higher tax progressivity on observed income inequality 
is reinforced by the negative productivity response, the positive tax evasion response, and pro-
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poor redistribution.  Consequently, we formulate the first hypothesis that can be tested with 
macro data:  
H1: The statistical relationship between tax progressivity and income inequality as 
measured by observed, reported income is likely to be negative. 
It is clear from equation (2) that redistribution in the form of transfers and other social 
welfare programs (captured by the last term) plays an important role in determining the 
redistributive properties of the income tax system.  The higher is θ, the more effective will be the 
income tax system in equalizing income levels.  This implies that countries with institutional 
structures that facilitate redistribution through transfers, such as democratic political systems, 
should be more effective in reducing inequality via its personal income tax.7  In other words, any 
factor that increases θ should reinforce the effect of progressivity on observed income inequality.  
This effect is captured by the following hypothesis, which we can test in the current framework: 
H2:  Factors that are positively associated with pro-poor redistribution such as 
democracy and civil liberties are likely to reinforce the negative effect of structural tax 
progressivity on observed income inequality. 
2.2. Inequality in True Income 
We now turn our attention to true income inequality.  Using the above notations, we 
define true income inequality ܫ௬כ  as the ratio of actual disposable income received by the rich 
relative to that received by the poor: 
ܫ௬כ ൌ
௬ೝכ
௬೛
כ ାீ
ൌ ௒ೝ
೚ሺଵିఛೝሻା௒ೝಹ
௒೛
೚൫ଵିఛ೛൯ା௒೛
ಹାఏఛೝ௒ೝ
೚. (3) 
                                                 
7This argument relies on the median voter hypothesis which is widely cited in the political economy literature on 
redistribution (Persson and Tabellini 1999 and Meltzer and Richard 1981).  Also see Gradstein et al (2001) and 
references therein for a discussion of the effect of democracy on income inequality.   
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 We again assume that redistribution through transfers is pro-poor (0<θ<1).  Given that 
true income is the sum of reported, observed income and unreported, hidden income, i.e., 
௥ܻ
כ ൌ ௥ܻ଴ ൅ ௥ܻு, we can obtain the following partial effect of structural progressivity on true 
income inequality, holding tax rates of poor ߬௣ and redistribution policy ߠ constant. 
߲ܫ௬כ
߲߬௥
ൌ
൤߲ ௥ܻ
଴
߲߬௥
ሺ1 െ ߬௥ሻ െ ௥ܻ௢ ൅
߲ ௥ܻு
߲߬௥
൨  െ ݕ௥
כ
ݕ௣כ ൅ ܩ
ߠ ൤߬௥
߲ ௥ܻ଴
߲߬௥
൅ ௥ܻ௢൨
ݕ௣כ ൅ ܩ
ൌ
൤߲ ௥ܻ
כ
߲߬௥
൫1 െ ߬௥ െ ܫݕ
כ ߠ߬௥൯ െ ሺ ௥ܻכ െ ௥ܻுሻ൫1 ൅ ܫݕ
כ ߠ൯ ൅ ߲ ௥ܻ
ு
߲߬௥
߬௥൫1 ൅ ܫݕ
כ ߠ൯൨  
ݕ௣כ ൅ ܩ
 
ൌ
߲ ௥ܻכ
߲߬௥
൅ ൫1 ൅ ܫݕ
כ ߠ൯ሾ ௥ܻுሺ1 ൅ ߳ுఛሻ െ ௥ܻכሺ1 ൅ ߳כఛሻሿ
ݕ௣כ ൅ ܩ
൏
൐
0, (4) 
where ∈Hτ and ∈*τ are the elasticity of hidden and true income with respect to tax changes, 
respectively. 
Equation (4) demonstrates that the effect of tax progressivity on true income inequality is 
ambiguous, when ∈Hτ>0.8  Higher taxes on the rich could increase actual income inequality if the 
share of hidden income among the rich is large while the elasticity of true income/productivity is 
small relative to the elasticity of hidden income.  For example, GMP (2008) find a large positive 
tax compliance response but small productivity/consumption response of affluent households to 
Russia’s 2001 flat rate personal income tax reform.  Thus, in countries like Russia, inequality 
might possibly decline through lowering tax rates for the upper income groups.   
While we do not observe true income in a typical household survey, expenditures or 
consumption are much closer to true permanent income than is reported income.  Individuals 
may feel more comfortable reporting their consumption levels because there is less association 
between consumption levels and personal income tax liability (see Lemieux, Fortin, and Fréchette 
                                                 
8 Even when ∈Hτ<0, as early theoretical models predict, but |∈Hτ|<1, the effect of tax progressivity on true income 
inequality is still ambiguous. 
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1994 and GMP 2008 for a similar assumption).  In addition, income data tend to suffer from 
recall bias, seasonality and other issues to a greater extent than consumption data (Deaton 1997).  
Although consumption data also suffer from seasonality, the ability to smooth consumption over 
a few months makes consumption data a much better measure of true income.  According to 
Deaton (1997), these problems, which favor the use of consumption data, are more serious in 
developing countries where a large proportion of the population tends to be self-employed 
primarily in agriculture.   
The testable implication of equation (4) is that in the presence of a positive tax evasion 
response, an increase in structural progressivity should lead to a more sizeable reduction in 
observed income inequality than in consumption inequality.  Consequently, we can postulate the 
third testable hypothesis: 
H3: The effect of structural progressivity on inequality in consumption is likely to be 
smaller than the effect of structural progressivity on inequality in observed net income.  A 
positive effect on consumption inequality is also possible. 
Another important implication of equation (4) is that the difference between the effect of 
tax changes on consumption inequality and their effect on observed income inequality is 
expected to increase with the extent of tax evasion.  In other words, the positive effect of 
structural progressivity on consumption inequality is more likely to be found in countries with 
higher ௥ܻு/ ௥ܻכ or larger informal sector.  Since the extent of tax evasion is not observable in our 
data, we cannot test this hypothesis directly.  However, we can see whether observable factors 
that increase the share of the informal sector ௥ܻு/ ௥ܻכ attenuate the effect of structural 
progressivity on consumption inequality (or make the effect less negative or even positive).  The 
weakness of legal institutions could be one of such factor as it is likely to be positively correlated 
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with the size of the informal sector.  To the extent we can measure the strength of legal 
institutions, one may anticipate that a positive effect of structural progressivity on consumption 
inequality is more likely to be found in countries with weaker legal institutions. This will be our 
fourth testable hypothesis.  
H4: The positive effect of structural progressivity on consumption inequality is more 
likely to be found in countries with weaker legal institutions. 
3. Measuring Inequality and Structural Progressivity 
3.1. Income Inequality Measure 
We test the hypotheses developed in the previous section using country-level Gini 
coefficients obtained from the World Institute for Development Research (WIDER v.2b), the 
International Labor Office LABORSTA, and European Commission EUROSTAT.  Altogether 
these sources provide us with 3512 Gini estimates from 1981 to 2005.  For the purpose of our 
analysis, we selected all Gini coefficients that are based on one of the three income definitions: 
gross income, disposable (net) income, and expenditures or consumption.  The selected Ginis 
were grouped into 3 categories of area coverage (national, urban or national with exclusions, and 
other), 4 categories of income adjustment (equivalence scale, per capita adjustment, no 
adjustment, and unknown), and 4 categories of data quality rating.9  We then averaged multiple 
Gini measures by country, year, income base, area coverage, income adjustment, and quality 
rating.  Finally, for a given country, year, and income base, we selected one average measure 
using the following set of preferences: national estimates are preferred to urban, rural and other 
                                                 
9 The data quality rating is designed by the WIDER.  It ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 denotes observations with a 
sufficient quality of the income concept and the survey.  As to other data sources, we assigned 1 to Eurostat data and 
2 to ILO estimates. 
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area coverage estimates, equivalence scales or per capita adjustment are chosen over no or 
unknown adjustment, higher quality ranking is preferred to lower quality ranking.   
This selection process left us with 1683 Gini estimates for 143 countries from 1981 to 
2005.10  The majority of the estimates meet the best practices as set out by the WIDER.  
Appendix Table A1 shows that 93% of the Gini estimates have national coverage, 75% have 
been adjusted for the household size, and 71% have a good quality rating, 1 or 2.  Also, the 
distribution across income base is suited for the type of analysis that we carry out in the paper.  
More specifically, of the total sample of Gini estimates, 20% are based on consumption, 34% on 
gross income, and 46% on net income.  To control for differences in Gini measurement, our 
estimates include dummy variables for income base, area coverage and income adjustment 
categories.  While we recognize that the use of dummy variables does not eliminate all of the 
biases resulting from comparability issues (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001), we are constrained 
by existing inequality estimates.  This is especially restricting in cross-country panel studies due 
to variations in the quality of primary data sources, differences in definition of variables and 
other procedures followed by individual countries. 
In an effort to identify the trend in income inequality over time, we regress the Gini 
coefficients on a quadratic time trend, controlling for income base, area coverage, income 
adjustment, and country classification.11  The coefficients on the time terms are then used to plot 
the average Gini trend in Figure 1.  The results indicate that income inequality increased 
throughout the 80s and 90s before declining during the 2000–2005 period.  Figure 1 also reports 
                                                 
10 The sample includes only countries that were independent in a corresponding year.  To avoid double counting, we 
excluded GINIs for the parts of the former unified countries like USSR or Yugoslavia prior to their breakup. 
11 A similar, though not identical, procedure is used by Easterly (2007) to address the consistency problem inherent 
in the GINI data.  Country categories are defined using the World Bank country classification based on historical 
(time-varying) income thresholds.  For example, the income thresholds used for the 2005 classification are as 
follows: low income, $875 or less, lower middle income, $876-$3465, upper middle income, $3466-$10725, and 
high income, $10725 or more. 
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the time trend weighted by a country’s GDP in constant U.S. dollars and population.12  While the 
GDP–weighted trend follows that of the unweighted, the population–weighted trend shows 
income inequality increasing throughout the sample period, which is consistent with rising 
inequality in China, India, and other developing countries with large populations. 
Table 1 provides additional summary statistics on the Gini coefficient by income 
definition across time.  However, one has to be careful in interpreting these numbers because of 
comparability issues.  In particular, the income–based and expenditure–based measures cannot 
be compared without a regression framework because the latter oversamples low and lower 
middle income countries while the former oversamples high and upper middle income countries 
(see Figure A1).  Bearing in mind this important caveat, the table shows that the consumption–
based Gini follows the unweighted trend in Figure 1; increasing from a low of 36 in the early 
1980s to a high of 41 in the early 1990s before declining to a low of 35 in the last period of the 
sample.  From Figure A1, we can conclude that this pattern of change is driven primarily by low 
and lower middle income countries.  Based on the income measures, we observe that gross (net) 
income inequality increased from 37(30) in the early 1980s to 43(36) in mid 1990s before falling 
back to 40(31) in the last period.  We also observe that gross income is most unequally 
distributed followed by consumption and net income.  These patterns are consistent with the 
literature (e.g., Easterly 2007). 
3.2. Tax Progressivity Measures 
In contrast to income inequality, the measures of tax progressivity are not readily 
available for cross-country comparison.  The existing measures implemented in the literature fall 
into one of three groups: 1) the top statutory PIT rate, 2) effective inequality-based measures of 
                                                 
12 We suspect that population may be the better of the two weights since inequality is essentially an individual 
concept. 
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progressivity, and 3) structural progressivity measures.  In their original form, none of these 
measures are perfectly suitable for our analysis. 
The top statutory PIT rate is a legally determined marginal tax rate applicable to the top 
bracket of the income tax schedule.  Although this tax rate has occasionally been used in 
empirical cross-country research as a proxy variable for tax progressivity, it might be a 
misleading indicator of progressivity since both proportional and highly progressive tax systems 
may, in principle, have the same top statutory rate.  In reality, however, there is a high (about 
0.5) correlation between the top rate and other progressivity measures that will be introduced 
below.  For that reason, we do not discard this variable and will employ it in some 
specifications.13 
The effective progressivity is based on some indicator of income inequality.  In its 
simplest form, effective progressivity is the ratio of after-tax Gini to before-tax Gini and 
“measures the extent to which a given tax structure results in a shift in the distribution of income 
toward equality” (Musgrave and Thin 1948).  More sophisticated measures have been proposed 
by Kakwani (1977), Suit (1977), and others.  The inequality-based measures generally require 
information on pre- and post-tax inequality and the distribution of the tax burden.  Information 
on these variables is either not available or not comparable across countries.  The more serious 
problem, though, is the issue of simultaneity in determination of income inequality and 
inequality-based progressivity, which inhibits the identification of the direct effect of tax 
progressivity on inequality. 
                                                 
13 As an alternative to the top statutory PIT rate, some studies employ the income-weighted average marginal tax 
rate (Easterly and Rebelo 1993).  While this approach can capture the average marginal rate, it does not measure the 
PIT progressivity.  This approach also imposes strong distributional assumptions on the marginal tax schedule which 
we are able to avoid due to the information that we have on each country’s personal income tax schedule.   
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From this perspective, the measures of structural progressivity are more suitable for the 
purpose of our analysis.  The term “structural progressivity” was introduced by Musgrave and 
Thin (1948) to denote changes in average and marginal rates along the income distribution.  
These changes can be identified without knowing after-tax inequality, making the endogeneity 
problem less severe.  However, the calculations require information on gross income 
distribution, which is difficult to gather in a comparable way at the cross-country level.  Another 
issue is which value to choose since structural progressivity changes along the income 
distribution. 
Ideally we need a single, comprehensive measure of PIT progressivity, which is 
comparable across countries, available for a large representative sample of countries, and vary 
over time.  We propose the following procedure to derive such a measure. 
The first step in calculating structural progressivity is to obtain average and marginal tax 
rates at different points of the income distribution.  Instead of actual income distribution, we use 
a country’s GDP per capita and its multiples as a comparable income base.  The GDP figures are 
rescaled to get 100 units of pre-tax income for each country and year, ranging from 4% to 400% 
of a country’s GDP per capita.  We then apply the tax schedule information to these units of 
income to obtain tax liability and average and marginal tax rates.  The data on national tax 
schedules is collected for 189 countries from 1981 to 2005 and described in detail in Sabirianova 
Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2008).  Here we just note that our average and marginal tax rates 
take into account standard deductions, basic personal allowances, tax credits, local taxes, major 
national surtaxes, multiple schedules, non-standard tax formulas, and other provisions in addition 
to statutory rates and thresholds. 
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The progressivity measures are obtained by regressing marginal (or average) rates on 
gross income using 100 data points that are formed around a country’s GDP per capita in a given 
year.  The slope coefficient on the income variable measures the percentage point change in the 
tax rate resulting from a one percentage point change in pre-tax income14 and is our measure of 
structural progressivity.  The PIT structure is interpreted as progressive, proportional or 
regressive if the slope coefficient is positive, zero or negative, respectively.  This procedure 
gives us marginal rate progression (MRP1) and average rate progression (ARP1) for each 
country and year in our dataset.  Figure 2 illustrates how the MRP1 is obtained for a hypothetical 
case with no allowances and other provisions.  
It should be noted that structural progressivity can deviate significantly from the nominal 
progressivity of the legal tax scale.  This is especially pertinent to low income countries, where 
taxable income of the majority of population is often below the first tax threshold.  Based on our 
procedure, countries for which a significant proportion of the population does not pay taxes will 
have progressivity measures of zero or close to zero.  This makes sense, since the tax structure is 
effectively proportional when no one is paying taxes, even if the statutory rate schedule is highly 
graduated. 
To obtain a single, comprehensive measure we had to impose a linearity restriction on the 
relationship between rates and income levels.  Given that the nominal tax schedule has a top 
statutory marginal rate, both the average and marginal rate progression measures, as defined by 
Musgrave and Thin (1948), decline as one moves up the income distribution.  In other words, the 
tax schedule is less progressive at the top of the income scale.  In an effort to capture this 
nonlinearity, we also calculated MRP2 and ARP2 for the bottom portion of the income scale up 
to 200% of a country’s GDP per capita.  Figure 2 illustrates MRP2 for a hypothetical case. 
                                                 
14 Pre-tax income is measured in percentage points relative to a country’s GDP per capita. 
 18
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the four progressivity measures across time.  To 
infer the global trend, mean values are weighted by a country’s share in world GDP and world 
population.  The pattern that stands out is that all of the measures declined throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s and then remained stable during the latter period, with the exception of ARP2 
that declined steadily over the whole period.  In concordance with the non-linear properties of 
progressivity (Musgrave and Thin 1948), our measures calculated for the bottom portion of the 
income scale tend to be larger than those for the full income scale, and the ARP measures are 
smaller than their corresponding MRP measures.  Table 2 also reports summary statistics on the 
top statutory PIT rate.  The top marginal tax rate has declined steadily from a high of 56% in the 
1981–1985 period to a low of 37% in the 2001–2005 period.  Since these global trends follow 
closely those reported in Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2008), we refer the reader to 
that paper for a more detailed description of the changes that have taken place over the last 25 
years. 
4. Empirical Methodology 
4.1. The OLS Model for Observed Income Inequality 
Following the theoretical framework discussed above, we write observed income 
inequality as a function of structural progressivity and other control variables: 
 ܫ௜௧ ൌ ߞ௧ ൅ ߚ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߤܦ௚,௜௧ ൅ ߜܼ௜௧ ൅ ߶ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  (5)  
where Iit is observed inequality measured by income-based Gini coefficients (either net or gross 
income15) in country i and year t,  ߞ௧ captures year effects, Pit is the relevant measure of PIT 
progressivity, Dg,it is a dummy equal one if Gini is based of gross income and zero if Gini is 
based on net income, Zit is a vector of control variables, Wit is a vector of auxiliary variables that 
                                                 
15 Following the theoretical framework in Section 2, progressivity may affect gross income distribution through 
productivity and tax evasion responses. 
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are included to control for consistency of the Gini coefficients (a dummy for national area 
coverage and a set of dummies for the type of income adjustment), and εit is the error term.  The 
Z vector includes the one-year lagged log of GDP per capita in quadratic form, the rate of 
inflation, the share of services in GDP, and the share of industry in GDP (see Appendix Table 
A2 for variable definitions).  The quadratic form of GDP per capita is used to account for the 
existence of the Kuznets Curve which postulates that there is a non-linear (inverted U) 
relationship between income inequality and per capita GDP.  If it exists, we expect a positive 
coefficient on the linear term and a negative coefficient on the quadratic term.  The share of 
services and industry in GDP are included to control for the effect of GDP composition on the 
distribution of income.  For example, an expanding service sector may benefit the rich relative to 
the poor thus leading to higher levels of income inequality.  Inflation is included to account for 
the possible equalizing effect of price stability on the distribution of income (Minarik 1979 and 
Bulir 2001).  The ߚ captures the effect of progressivity on inequality in observed income, and 
according to our first hypothesis it is expected to be negative. 
The OLS results reported in Tables 3 and 4 by and large confirm these expectations.  A 
one percentage point increase in the top statutory PIT rate reduces the Gini by 0.08 points, ceteris 
paribus.16  Inequality in gross income is predictably higher than inequality in net income.  The 
sign of the coefficients on both GDP terms is consistent with the Kuznets hypothesis.  Table 4 
includes the same set of covariates as in Table 3, except for the top statutory PIT rate, which is 
replaced with one of the measures of structural progressivity.  All of the progressivity measures 
have a statistically significant negative effect on income inequality.  The magnitude of the 
marginal effects is, however, small.  A 100% increase in any progressivity measure reduces the 
                                                 
16 The GINI is measured on a scale from 0 to 100. 
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Gini coefficient by less than 20% at the mean.  For example, a twofold increase in the MRP1 
slope from 0.062 (mean) to 0.124 is estimated to reduce the Gini coefficient by 1.57 
(=25.317*0.062); not such a large effect given that the sample mean of Gini coefficients for net 
and gross income is 37.   
4.2. The IV Model for Observed Income Inequality 
Despite the promising start, there are several reasons to believe that the OLS results 
reported in the previous section might be biased and inconsistent.  For example, the ideal 
estimating procedure would be to use country fixed effects to account for heterogeneity among 
countries.  However, the use of fixed effects is problematic given the limited within variation in 
the dependent variable for some countries.  The Gini data are mostly sparse for a number of the 
countries in our sample.17  To the extent that constant country characteristics are correlated with 
the error term, omitted fixed effects create an endogeneity bias. 
Another form of endogeneity bias stems from the fact that structural progressivity by 
itself is an estimated parameter with associated standard errors.  This can lead to an attenuation 
bias in the estimated effects, assuming that standard errors follow the properties of the classical 
error-in-variables problem.  
Finally, an endogeneity bias may arise from reverse causality.  The political economy 
literature has long established a reverse relationship between income inequality and taxes 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981, Persson and Tabellini 1999).  Also, much of the empirical work that 
examines the effect of income inequality on economic growth argues that inequality affects 
growth through its effect on taxes and redistribution, (Perotti 1992, Persson and Tabellini 1994, 
Barro 2000, Milanovic 2000, among others).  The general argument, based on the median voter 
                                                 
17 Some countries either have one income base or they have both but only for some years.  Furthermore, there are a 
number of countries for which GINI data is only available for few years.   
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hypothesis, is that as the ratio of median income to mean income falls (i.e., inequality increases), 
the median voter will vote for higher taxes and greater redistribution.  Therefore, greater income 
inequality should lead to greater progressivity.  This reverse causality implies that the OLS 
estimates of ߚ are likely to be biased upwards. 
Therefore, all three sources of endogeneity (omitted variables, measurement error, and 
reverse causality) could bias the estimated effects of progressivity on observed income 
inequality.  To account for the endogeneity of our progressivity measures, we rely on the tax 
competition models to create instrumental variables using the corresponding tax variables from 
neighboring countries.  Theoretically, we expect that tax variables in country A will be correlated 
with tax variables in bordering country B, as countries compete for the tax base, but will only 
affect country B’s level of inequality via this correlation.  As such, we create instruments for 
each progressivity measure using distance-population weighted averages of tax/progressivity 
measures in neighboring countries (Sabirianova Peter 2008).  The choice of weights used is 
driven by the need to account for both the ease with which individuals can travel from country A 
to country B (distance from A’s capital to B’s capital) and the volume of the potential flow 
(population).  Since the tax rates in country A do not have an independent effect on income 
inequality in country B, we expect that our instruments will be uncorrelated with the error term 
in equation (5). 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report 2SLS estimates of ߚ using average top PIT rate in 
bordering countries, IV(a), and average MRP1 and marginal rate at the level of income 
equivalent to four times GDP per capita in bordering countries, IV(b); all instrumental variables 
are weighted by distance and population.  The F-statistic for excluded instruments rejects the 
null that the instruments have no explanatory power in the first stage.  Since we used two 
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instruments in column 3, we are able to implement the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test.  
The large p-values reported in Table 3 means that we cannot reject the null that the orthogonality 
conditions for the instruments are satisfied.   
Both IV results are qualitatively similar to the OLS results presented in column 1.  The 
most obvious difference, though, is that the IV estimates are much larger, indicating that 
endogeneity is a serious problem.  An increase in the top PIT rate by one percentage point now 
reduces the Gini coefficient by 0.64 points, when one instrument is used and by 1.61 points when 
two instrumental variables are used.  Also interesting is the significance of the Kuznets curve in 
both IV specifications.   
A similar pattern of results is observed in Table 4 where the results of our primary 
progressivity measures are reported.  The instrument used in IV(a) is the average top statutory 
PIT rate in bordering countries.  In IV(b), MRP1 is instrumented by weighted MRP1 and 
marginal tax rate at income equivalent to 4⋅GDP per capita; other progressivity measures are 
instrumented similarly using one progressivity slope and one tax rate from neighboring 
countries.  All instruments are weighted by distance and population.  The choice of instruments 
is supported by the statistical validity tests, including the Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentification.   
All progressivity measures are estimated to have a negative and statistically significant 
effect on observed income inequality.  Furthermore, unlike the OLS results, the effect on income 
inequality is large in magnitude.  Increasing ARP1 by 0.01 (or 20% increase at the mean), for 
example, reduces the Gini coefficient by 3.9 points or about 10%.  These results all point to the 
significant role played by progressive taxes in the redistribution of observed, reported income.  
The effect of progressivity on true income inequality remains undetermined. 
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4.3. The Role of Democratic Institutions in Observed Income Inequality 
The effect of progressivity on observed income inequality, though shown to be 
unambiguously negative, may be affected by the redistribution policy of the government.  Pro-
rich redistribution in the presence of rising progressivity may cause the estimated effect of 
progressivity to be smaller than it actually is (in absolute value).  We therefore expect that 
environments that are conducive to pro-poor redistribution will have a greater progressivity 
effect.  In particular, pro-poor policies are more likely to be implemented in countries with 
stronger democratic institutions that give people a voice in their political and economic 
governance to ensure liberty and equality.  Theoretical arguments for a positive relationship 
between democracy and pro-poor redistribution come from the median voter hypothesis.  
According to this hypothesis, the median voter votes for higher tax progressivity and greater 
redistribution to the poor as income inequality rises (Meltzer and Richard 1981, Persson and 
Tabellini 1999).  Since the ability to vote requires some kind of democratic process, the median 
voter hypothesis implies that there is a positive link between democracy and pro-poor 
redistribution.  In other words, the more democratic the political process, the more likely it is that 
the median voter will have some influence over policy making.  In particular, to the extent that 
income is distributed unequally, having a more democratic political process should be positively 
correlated with pro-poor redistribution (Gradstein, Milanovic and Ying 2001). 
Given the theoretical result in equation (2) and our second hypothesis (H2), we expect 
that stronger democratic institutions, indicating greater likelihood of pro-poor redistribution, 
should reinforce the negative inequality effect of progressivity.  In order to test this hypothesis, 
we extend the baseline equation (5) to include an interaction term between the progressivity 
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measures and democratic indicators.  Given the above discussion, we expect the coefficient on 
the interaction term to be negative.   
The democratic indicators include two Freedom House 7-point country ratings of civil 
liberties and political rights and a composite democracy score, which is a revised combined 
POLITY IV score from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management.  
The original Freedom House ratings are reversed on a scale from 1 to 7, with the lowest value 
indicating no liberty or rights.  The POLITY IV democracy score is measured on a scale from -
10 to 10, with 10 indicating strong democracy and -10 indicating strong autocracy. 
The results with democratic institutions are shown in Table 5 for each of the four 
measures of structural progressivity.  We report only estimated coefficients on progressivity, 
democratic institutions, and their interaction.  Other covariates have similar effects as in Table 3 
and thus not reported.  It is interesting that in countries with zero structural progressivity, the 
direct effect of democratic institutions on income inequality is inconsistent across specifications 
and varies from zero to positive.  What stays consistent across all specifications and all measures 
of democracy and structural progressivity is that the negative effect of progressivity on observed 
income inequality is reinforced by democratic institutions.  Civil and political liberties are 
estimated to improve the effectiveness of the progressivity measures.  
The results show that using progressivity as a means of equalizing income may not be the 
best policy to implement in environments that offer little in the way of pro-poor redistribution.  
This further implies that equalizing the distribution of income via personal income taxes require 
not only progressive tax structures, but also active pro-poor redistribution policies on the 
expenditure side of the budget. 
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4.4. The Effect of Progressivity on Inequality in Consumption 
One of the main predictions of the theoretical framework is that changes in progressivity 
may affect true and observed income inequality differently.  This theoretical result is very 
important since it suggests that policies that are often thought to reduce income inequality may 
actually be worsening the distribution of income.  Likewise, policies that appear to be worsening 
the distribution of income may, in reality, be improving equality.  For example, one argument 
against implementing a flat rate personal income tax is that it is grossly unfair and will lead to 
high levels of inequality.  However, if tax evasion is widespread and the evasion response to tax 
changes is large relative to the productivity response among the rich, then what would appear to 
be increased inequality would in fact be a more equal distribution of true (reported and hidden) 
after-tax income.  According to our theoretical framework, the difference between true and 
observed inequality effects of tax changes is increasing with the share of unreported income in 
the economy.   
The difficulty in testing this hypothesis is to obtain a measure of true income inequality.  
Such a measure requires that individuals report their true disposable income to surveyors.  This, 
it is well known, is not the case.  Individuals often underreport their income to tax authorities.  
Also, possibly out of fear that they will be caught and penalized, they tend to underreport their 
income on surveys as well.  In an effort to measure true income inequality, we therefore rely on 
expenditures/consumption-based Ginis as a proxy for true income inequality.  The logic behind 
this choice is that, individuals generally do not associate consumption with personal income tax 
liability and are therefore more likely to report their true level of consumption.  That is, we 
assume that the consumption levels people report on surveys is closer to true income than the 
income they report; both of which are assumed to be larger than income reported for taxation 
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purposes.  Given this assumption, the estimated effect of progressivity on consumption-based 
Ginis will represent a lower bound on the effect on true income inequality. 
A more serious problem, however, is the limited number of countries for which 
consumption-based Ginis are calculated.  Furthermore, as is evident from Figure A2, there is a 
systematic difference in the type of countries that use a given income base for Gini calculation.  
We observe, for example, that rich and upper middle income countries are underrepresented in 
consumption-based Ginis while low and lower middle income countries are overrepresented.  
This implies that any differential effect in progressivity obtained without considering this 
selection issue may be purely spurious.  To correct for this sample selection problem, we develop 
sample probability weights using the following procedure. 
First, we divide the whole universe of independent countries in a given year into 3 equal 
groups by population and 4 equal groups by GDP per capita (in 1990 USD).  This gives us a total 
of 12 population-GDP cells (3 x 4) for which we calculate the number of countries in the general 
population in a given year (NPt).  Then, for each income base separately (gross income, net 
income, and consumption), we calculate the number of countries in our estimation sample that is 
in each population-GDP cell in a given year (NSt).  The ratio of NSt to NPt is the probability that 
a given country observation (for a given income base) is included in the estimation sample.  For 
example, a ratio of 1/5 means that only 20% of the world countries from a specific cell are 
included in the estimation sample in a given year.  We use the inverse of this probability, which 
varies from 1 to 24 with a mean of 3.75, as the probability sample weight in our subsequent 
estimations. 
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To capture the differential effect of progressivity on inequality in observed income vs. 
consumption, we re-estimate the baseline model with interaction terms for different income 
bases.  The estimated model is specified as follows: 
ܫ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߞ௧ ൅ ߚ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߤଵܦ௚,௜௧ ൅ ߤଶܦ௡,௜௧ ൅ ߣଵ ௜ܲ௧ · ܦ௚,௜௧ ൅ ߣଶ ௜ܲ௧ · ܦ௡,௜௧ ൅ ߜܼ௜௧ ൅ ߶ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧  (6)  
where Dg and Dn are dummy variables which are equal to one if the Gini base is gross or net 
income, respectively.  Consumption-based Gini is the omitted base category.  The Z and W 
vectors contain the same set of covariates as in equation (5).  From hypothesis H3, we expect 
both λs to be negative.  The sign of ߚ, however, is not clear as it depends on the spread of 
evasion and its responsiveness to tax changes and may or may not be positive.   
The model is estimated separately for each measure of progressivity; the OLS results 
with and without the probability sample weights are reported in Table 6.  Since the OLS results 
maybe biased, we also implement estimation with instrumental variables – the distance-
population weighted average of the corresponding progressivity measure in bordering countries 
and its interactions with the Gini income base.  The large Shea’s partial R-squared indicate that 
the chosen instruments are not weak.  Examinations of the interaction terms reveal strong 
support for our hypothesis that progressivity has a differential effect on inequality in 
consumption vs. inequality in observed income.  The estimated coefficients on interaction terms 
(λs) are negative and statistically significant across all specifications and all measures of 
progressivity.  What is also interesting is the increase in the size and significance of λ as we 
move from gross to net income-based measures of income inequality.  At the same time, the sign 
of the OLS-estimated ߚ coefficients (both weighted and unweighted) is not consistent across 
specifications and shifts from negative to positive.  In this regard, the IV estimates provide more 
consistent results and point to the negative effect of structural progressivity on inequality in 
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consumption.  The effect is statistically significant in 3 of 4 specifications.  These results indicate 
that for a typical country in the sample, while progressivity reduces inequality in both observed 
income and consumption, it appears to have much greater influence on net income-based Ginis.   
In section 2.2, we argued that tax evasion can explain the difference between the effect of 
progressivity on observed net income and its effect on true income approximated by 
consumption.  Hence, we expect that the difference between these two effects is likely to 
increase with the share of hidden income in the economy.  In other words, country A, with 
identical progressivity but lower incidence of tax evasion than country B, will be more effective 
in reducing inequality via its progressive tax structure.   
Although we cannot measure the extent of tax evasion, we can reasonably assume that 
weak legal institutions and ineffective law enforcement are highly correlated with tax evasion 
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972, Alm 1999, Alm and McKee 2006, and Slemrod 2007).  Thus, we 
can anticipate that countries with stronger law and order will experience a greater impact of 
progressivity on reduction in consumption inequality.  This last hypothesis (H4) is tested by 
using consumption-based Ginis as the dependent variable and including interaction terms 
between progressivity and the law and order index obtained from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). 
Table 7 reports the estimates of the following model: 
ܫ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߞ௧ ൅ ߚ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߪܮ௜௧ ൅ ߨ ௜ܲ௧ כ ܮ௜௧ ൅ ߜܼ௜௧ ൅ ߶ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧, (7) 
where Lit is law and order index for country i in year t.  The model is estimated by OLS and IV 
methods using the distance-population weighted average of the corresponding progressivity 
measure in bordering countries and its interaction with the law and order index as instrumental 
variables.  
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The results reported in Table 7 are largely consistent with our expectations despite a 
relatively small sample size of consumption-based Ginis (N=220).  We note, for example, that 
for countries with worse law and order (index=0), the estimated βs are positive and statistically 
significant for all progressivity measures; they are also large in magnitude.  This result suggests 
that a positive relationship between progressivity and consumption-based inequality might exist, 
especially in countries with poor institutions.  The coefficients on the interaction terms are all 
negative and thus support the hypothesis that progressivity has the most equalizing effect in 
economic environments less conducive to tax evasion. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework that yields four testable hypotheses 
about the relationship between tax progressivity and income inequality.  Firstly, we show that 
increased structural progressivity of the PIT structure reduces observed income inequality (H1), 
and that this effect depends on the type of redistributive environment (H2).  We also derive that 
structural progressivity has a differential effect on observed vs. actual income inequality (H3), 
and that the difference between two effects is positively related to the spread of tax evasion in 
the economy (H4).     
We develop and estimate comprehensive, time-varying measures of structural 
progressivity of national income tax systems.  We then use these progressivity measures and the 
Gini coefficients to test the above four hypotheses.  As predicted, we find that PIT progressivity 
reduces observed inequality in reported gross and net income and show that this negative effect 
on observed income inequality is particularly strong in countries with more developed 
democratic institutions.  At the same time, we find a significantly smaller negative effect of PIT 
progressivity on true inequality, approximated by consumption-based measures of Gini.  We also 
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establish that the effect of tax progressivity on consumption inequality can be positive, especially 
in countries with weak law and order that increase the likelihood of tax evasion. 
Our empirical analysis implies that the tradeoff between equity and efficiency does in 
fact exist.  This follows from the negative relationship that we identify between progressivity and 
income inequality.  The result suggests that as taxes become more efficient, via lower 
progressivity, income inequality tends to increase.  This result by itself points to the importance 
of taking into account the equity effects of shifts in tax policy towards greater efficiency.   
What we find particularly interesting, though, is that the cost of efficiency differs across 
country groups.  Because tax evasion is so pervasive in developing countries, our results lead us 
to speculate that developing countries face much lower equity costs of efficiency.  That is, to the 
extent that efficiency is achieved by lowering the progressivity of taxes, developing countries 
with their higher levels of tax evasion, lose a lot less in terms of equity than developed countries.  
If flatter taxes can reduce the size of the underground economy, then they may actually improve 
the distribution of income via the direct compliance response and via pro-poor redistribution of 
increased tax revenues from higher levels of compliance.  Developed countries on the other 
hand, may not benefit much from this evasion effect due to higher tax compliance rates to begin 
with.  This may possibly explain why flat taxes are relatively more popular in developing 
countries than developed countries. 
These results have important policy implications, especially given the debate surrounding 
the implementation of flat taxes.  The common argument is to say that flat taxes, while efficient, 
will lead to greater levels of income inequality.  We are arguing that this need not be the case for 
all countries. While observed income inequality will likely increase following the 
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implementation of a flat tax, actual income inequality may not change and may even improve in 
countries that suffer from high levels of tax evasion. 
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Table 1: Average Gini by Income Base and Period 
   
Income Base 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005
Consumption 36.250 37.180 41.390 37.606 34.954 
 (6.137) (8.994) (10.795) (8.132) (6.837) 
 [21] [54] [98] [124] [40] 
Gross income 37.469 39.420 42.934 42.327 40.150 
 (11.132) (12.074) (12.484) (10.151) (8.082) 
 [96] [109] [162] [150] [62] 
Net income 29.889 33.664 34.824 35.713 30.979 
 (8.604) (11.245) (10.406) (10.922) (6.285) 
 [84] [113] [169] [242] [159] 
Total 34.174 36.625 39.387 38.090 33.766 
 (10.331) (11.450) (11.892) (10.458) (7.812) 
 [201] [276] [429] [516] [261] 
 
Notes: Number of Gini observations is 1683; number of country-year observations is 1229.  Standard deviation is in 
parentheses and number of Gini observations is in brackets.  
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Table 2:  Structural PIT Progressivity by Period 
 
Progressivity 
measure 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 Total 
Top PIT Rate 56.144 48.294 42.085 39.984 36.772 44.479 
(12.717) (13.153) (11.053) (9.959) (9.482) (13.216) 
[553] [585] [702] [793] [826] [3459] 
MRP1 0.069 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.061 
(0.052) (0.046) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028) (0.040) 
MRP2 0.114 0.105 0.089 0.092 0.091 0.098 
(0.094) (0.083) (0.072) (0.070) (0.067) (0.078) 
ARP1 0.054 0.048 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.045 
(0.043) (0.037) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.034) 
ARP2 0.083 0.076 0.064 0.063 0.058 0.068 
(0.073) (0.061) (0.055) (0.054) (0.050) (0.059) 
[449] [502] [603] [711] [715] [2980] 
 
Notes:  Standard deviation is in parentheses and number of country-year observations is in brackets.  MRP1 and 
ARP1 is marginal and average tax rate progressions up to an income level equivalent to four times a country’s GDP 
per capita; MRP2 and ARP2 is marginal and average tax rate progressions for the levels of income up to 2⋅y, where 
y is a country’s GDP per capita.  .    
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Table 3:  Base Specification for Inequality in Observed Income 
 
 OLS IV (a) IV (b) Mean (Std.dev.) 
Top PIT Rate -0.080*** -0.639*** -1.613*** 39.666 
 (0.017) (0.102) (0.226) (14.160) 
Log (GDP per capita)t-1 6.017* 16.251*** 29.664*** 8.480 
 (3.354) (4.648) (8.361) (1.453) 
Log (GDP per capita)t-1 squared -0.531*** -1.081*** -1.794*** 74.013 
 (0.187) (0.261) (0.477) (24.075) 
Service, % GDP 0.193*** -0.058 -0.412*** 57.437 
 (0.061) (0.083) (0.155) (12.428) 
Industry, % GDP -0.244*** -0.335*** -0.339** 32.921 
 (0.068) (0.088) (0.158) (7.705) 
Inflation  0.001 0.001 -0.001 60.815 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (316.894) 
Gini based on gross income  7.041*** 6.904*** 6.985*** 0.414 
(dummy) (0.634) (0.909) (1.667)  
National coverage (dummy) -0.526 3.006* 9.348*** 0.926 
 (0.899) (1.568) (3.311)  
Income adjustment      
Equivalence scale -0.993 2.869** 9.894*** 0.318 
 (0.674) (1.335) (2.910)  
Per capita adjustment 6.286*** 7.304*** 8.051*** 0.388 
 (0.684) (0.995) (1.923)  
Unknown adjustment -0.891 0.967 2.739 0.024       
 (1.278) (1.936) (3.342)  
N (observations) 1252 1116 1100 1252 
R-squared 0.44 … … … 
Wild chi2 … 533.040*** 174.070*** … 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic … just identified 1.053 … 
Sargan-Hansen p-value … … 0.305 … 
F-test of excluded IVs … 72.750*** 27.580*** … 
Partial R2 of excluded IVs … 0.074 0.044 … 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The dependent variable is Gini in gross or net income.  Year dummies are included in all three models but not 
shown here.  Instrument in (a) is the distance-population weighted top PIT rate in bordering countries.  Instruments 
in (b) are distance-population weighted MRP1 and marginal rate at income 4⋅y in neighboring countries, where y is 
a country’s GDP per capita.  The omitted category for income adjustment is “no adjustment”. 
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Table 4:  Structural Progressivity and Inequality in Observed Income 
 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Mean (std.dev.) 0.062 0.122 0.055 0.093 
 (0.035) (0.082) (0.033) (0.065) 
OLS     
Progressivity -25.317** -35.219*** -113.219*** -61.466*** 
 (10.004) (4.489) (11.281) (5.015) 
N (observations) 1117 1117 1117 1120 
R-squared 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.53 
     
IV (a):  IV = Weighted top PIT rate in bordering countries 
Progressivity -368.334*** -266.514*** -394.222*** -183.006*** 
 (54.700) (53.099) (52.352) (25.252) 
N (observations) 983 983 983 986 
F-test of excluded IV 74.876*** 23.925*** 74.222*** 64.133*** 
Partial R2 of excluded IV 0.065 0.026 0.074 0.062 
     
IV (b)     
Progressivity -579.635*** -212.371*** -392.518*** -173.406*** 
 (68.177) (19.870) (27.781) (11.958) 
N (observations) 970 970 970 973 
IVs W_MRP1 & 
W_MR at 4y 
W_ARP2 & 
W_MR at 2y 
W_ARP1 & 
W_AR at 4y 
W_ARP2 & 
W_AR at 3y 
F-test of excluded IVs 41.419*** 61.930*** 148.927*** 170.325*** 
Partial R2 of excluded IVs 0.089 0.139 0.286 0.277 
Sargan-Hansen J statistic 1.120 1.841 0.905 0.689 
Sargan-Hansen p-value 0.290 0.175 0.342 0.407 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The dependent variable is Gini in gross or net income.  Estimation is done for each progressivity measure separately.  
Each specification includes the same set of covariates as in Table 3, however, only the variable of interest is reported 
above.  Prefix “W_” denotes distance-population weighted average of the corresponding measure in bordering 
countries.  MRP1 and ARP1 is marginal and average tax rate progressions for income up to 4⋅y; MRP2 and ARP2 is 
marginal and average tax rate progressions for income up to 2⋅y, where y is a country’s GDP per capita. 
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Table 5:  Structural Progressivity, Gini in Observed Income, and the Role of Democratic 
Institutions 
 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Progressivity 143.289*** 17.483 41.347 -18.921 
 (43.616) (21.216) (54.228) (28.964) 
Civil liberties 0.264 -0.145 0.354 0.069 
 (0.458) (0.368) (0.395) (0.343) 
Progressivity*Civil liberties -28.422*** -8.136** -24.881*** -6.792 
 (6.966) (3.273) (8.410) (4.497) 
N (observations) 1100 1100 1100 1103 
R-squared 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.53 
Progressivity 143.519*** 55.826** 162.981*** 56.634* 
 (42.603) (21.975) (56.260) (30.688) 
Political rights 0.062 0.030 0.617* 0.283 
 (0.368) (0.295) (0.318) (0.293) 
Progressivity*Political rights -26.745*** -13.851*** -42.972*** -18.159*** 
 (6.471) (3.287) (8.413) (4.577) 
N (observations) 1100 1100 1100 1103 
R-squared 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.54 
Progressivity 88.655*** 11.095 21.740 -8.226 
 (20.845) (10.763) (28.264) (13.592) 
Democracy score 0.571*** 0.358*** 0.582*** 0.355*** 
 (0.134) (0.105) (0.116) (0.098) 
Progressivity*Democracy score -15.398*** -5.912*** -17.989*** -7.118*** 
 (2.270) (1.112) (2.901) (1.420) 
N (observations) 1030 1030 1030 1033 
R-squared 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.54 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The dependent variable is Gini in gross/net income.  All specifications include the same set of covariates as in Table 
3 except for democratic institutions and their interaction with progressivity measures reported above.  Original 
Freedom House 7-point ratings for civil liberties and political rights are on the reverse scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is 
no freedom.  Democracy score is a revised combined POLITY v.4 score that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 
+10 (strongly democratic).   
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Table 6:  The Differential Effect of Progressivity on Inequality in Consumption and 
Observed Income  
 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Panel A: OLS unweighted estimates 
Progressivity 52.420*** 2.278 -21.417 -32.085*** 
 (18.976) (9.102) (23.044) (10.111) 
Progressivity*Gross income -46.211** -20.789** -52.302** -15.303 
 (21.585) (9.803) (24.275) (11.293) 
Progressivity*Net income -93.205*** -46.963*** -111.808*** -38.373*** 
 (20.327) (9.839) (24.592) (11.240) 
Gini income base     
Gross income 10.840*** 10.128*** 10.317*** 9.818*** 
 (1.242) (1.066) (1.133) (1.041) 
Net income 6.819*** 6.163*** 6.521*** 4.861*** 
 (1.149) (1.061) (1.163) (1.062) 
N (observations) 1376 1376 1376 1379 
R-squared 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.48 
Panel B: OLS estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity 49.275** 5.560 -8.220 -25.498** 
 (20.163) (9.957) (25.568) (12.037) 
Progressivity*Gross income -39.183* -23.367** -59.689** -22.050* 
 (23.001) (10.780) (27.240) (13.131) 
Progressivity*Net income -92.633*** -47.627*** -115.739*** -39.597*** 
 (21.337) (10.623) (26.914) (12.798) 
Gini income base     
Gross income 11.364*** 11.153*** 11.302*** 10.910*** 
 (1.297) (1.090) (1.179) (1.078) 
Net income 7.596*** 6.733*** 7.111*** 5.407*** 
 (1.213) (1.094) (1.196) (1.105) 
N (observations) 1376 1376 1376 1379 
R-squared 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.52 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is Gini in either gross/net income or expenditures/consumption.  Gini in consumption is the 
omitted category for the income base.  All specifications include the same set of covariates as in Table 3. 
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Table 6 cont’d:  The Differential Effect of Progressivity on Inequality in Consumption and 
Observed Income  
 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Panel C: IV estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity -94.247 -166.785*** -205.317*** -118.846*** 
 (70.899) (53.589) (55.481) (24.950) 
Progressivity*Gross income -239.419*** -26.673 -76.053 -14.721 
 (69.731) (38.380) (52.369) (24.647) 
Progressivity*Net income -309.775*** -129.858*** -182.409*** -70.702*** 
 (72.892) (41.670) (51.152) (23.236) 
Gini income base     
Gross income 18.585*** 8.403*** 10.542*** 9.471*** 
 (3.287) (3.234) (2.104) (1.780) 
Net income 15.737*** 13.163*** 9.978*** 8.457*** 
 (3.112) (3.252) (1.963) (1.676) 
N (observations) 1191 1191 1191 1194 
     
Shea’s partial R2 (first stage)     
Progressivity 0.169 0.113 0.275 0.276 
Progressivity*Gross income 0.251 0.265 0.400 0.378 
Progressivity*Net income 0.203 0.225 0.380 0.357 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is Gini in either gross/net income or expenditures/consumption.  Gini in consumption is the 
omitted category for the income base.  All specifications include the same set of covariates as in Table 3.  IVs are 
the distance-population weighted average of the corresponding progressivity measure in bordering countries and its 
interactions with the Gini income base.  The models are just identified. 
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Table 7:  The Effect of Progressivity and Law and Order on Inequality in Consumption 
 
 Progressivity Measures 
 MRP1 MRP2 ARP1 ARP2 
Panel A: OLS estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity 123.257** 69.882** 220.034*** 93.332** 
 (55.926) (27.892) (72.221) (40.170) 
Law and order -0.078 0.025 0.572 0.010 
 (1.017) (0.847) (0.971) (0.855) 
Progressivity *Law and order -21.586 -17.505* -57.483*** -28.477*** 
 (16.580) (8.909) (20.908) (9.821) 
N (observations) 220 220 220 220 
R-squared 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 
Panel B: IV estimates with probability sample weights 
Progressivity 373.247*** 349.689*** 664.509*** 402.991* 
 (96.584) (97.715) (179.011) (214.568) 
Law and order 1.094 2.227 2.560** 2.025* 
 (1.479) (1.625) (1.306) (1.177) 
Progressivity *Law and order -55.935** -64.909*** -143.961*** -95.026*** 
 (25.233) (21.152) (37.964) (36.336) 
N (observations) 185 185 185 185 
     
Shea’s partial R2 (first stage)     
Progressivity 0.281 0.173 0.274 0.116 
Progressivity *Law and order 0.291 0.213 0.333 0.258 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.  The dependent variable is Gini in consumption. All specifications include the same set of covariates as in 
Table 3.  The law and order index is measured on a scale from 0 to 6, with 0 representing the worst law and order.  
IVs are the distance-population weighted average of the corresponding progressivity measure in bordering 
countries and its interaction with the law and order index.  The models are just identified.  
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Notes:  Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical schedule of marginal rates (MR), with top statutory PIT rate 50% and no 
deductions and tax credits.  Marginal rate progression (MRP) is the estimated slope coefficient from regressing 
marginal rates on gross income (as percent of GDP per capita).  MRP1 is calculated for gross income from 4% to 
400% of y, MRP2 is calculated for gross income from 4% to 200% of y, where y is a country’s GDP per capita. 
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Figure 3: Sample Composition by Income Base 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1:  Sample Composition 
 
Categories Selected Sample Estimation Sample 
Income base   
Consumption 0.200 0.186 
Gross income 0.344 0.337 
Net income 0.456 0.477 
Income adjustment   
Equivalence scale  0.259 0.278 
Per capita adjustment 0.490 0.465 
No adjustment 0.221 0.230 
Unknown 0.030 0.027 
Area coverage   
National 0.931 0.927 
Urban or national with exclusions 0.042 0.043 
Other 0.027 0.030 
Data quality   
1 – underlying concepts known 
and judged sufficient  0.393 0.418 
2 - income concept or survey is 
problematic or unknown or 
estimates not verified  
 0.315 0.317 
3 - income concept and survey are 
problematic or unknown 0.292 0.265 
N (Gini observations) 1683 1538 
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Table A2: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Name Description of Variables and Data Sources 
Gini coefficient The measure of income inequality used is the Gini Coefficient reported by 
WIIDER, WDI, ILO and EUROSTAT. 
Tax variables 
The source for all tax variables is World Tax Indicators v.1 (Sabirianova Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan 2008). 
Top statutory PIT rate (%) Legally determined marginal tax rate applicable to the top bracket of the 
personal income tax schedule. 
ARP1 ARP1 characterizes the structural progressivity of national tax schedules 
with respect to the changes in average rates along the income distribution.  It 
is the slope coefficient from regressing actual average tax rates on the log of 
gross income for the income distribution up to 4⋅y income, where y is a 
country’s GDP per capita. 
ARP2 Average rate progression for the income distribution up to 2⋅y income. 
MRP1 MRP1 characterizes the structural progressivity of national tax schedules 
with respect to the changes in marginal rates along the income distribution.  
It is the slope coefficient from regressing actual marginal tax rates on the log 
of gross income for the income distribution up to 4⋅y income. 
MRP2 Marginal rate progression for the income distribution up to 2⋅y income. 
Institutional variables
Law and order The law and order index is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system as well as an assessment of popular observance of the law.  
The index is on the scale from 0 to 6, with 0 representing the worst law and 
order. 
Source:  International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Civil liberties The civil liberties index gives an indication of the extent to which 
individuals are allowed “… freedoms of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without 
interference from the state.”  The original index is reversed on the scale from 
1-7, with 1 representing no freedom.   
Source:  Freedom House 
Political rights The political rights index gives an indication of the extent to which 
individuals are allowed “… to participate freely in the political process, 
including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate 
elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, 
and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and 
are accountable to the electorate.”  The original index is reversed on the 
scale from 1-7, with 1 representing no freedom.   
Source:  Freedom House
Democracy score This is the revised POLITY IV score constructed from two other indices; 
autocracy (AUTOC) and democracy (DEMOC).  Democracy indicates the 
general openness of political institutions, while autocracy indicates the 
general closeness of political institutions.  The POLITY IV score is 
measured on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly 
democratic).  
Source: Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM) 
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Other control variables 
GDP per capita (log) Log of GDP per capita.  Gross Domestic Product per capita is calculated 
using GDP (in US$ at 1990 prices) divided by country population. 
Sources:  United Nations Common Database (UNCD). 
Inflation rate (%) Percentage change in annual CPI. 
Sources:  IMF IFS (2006), IMF WEO (2006), ILO Laborsta (2006), EIU 
(2005), and IMF WEO annual reports 
Services (% of GDP) Service sector’s value added as a share of GDP.  Services include wholesale 
and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and 
communication; financing, insurance, real estate and business services; 
public administration and defense; community, social and personal services.  
This sector is derived as a residual (from GDP less agriculture and industry).  
Sources:  WB WDI (2007) supplemented by EIU (2005), UNECE (2007), 
ECLAC (2005) and publications of national statistical offices. 
Industry (% of GDP) Industry sector’s value added as a share of GDP.  Industry includes mining, 
manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas.  
Sources:  WB WDI (2007) supplemented by EIU (2005), UNECE (2007), 
ECLAC (2005) and publications of national statistical offices. 
 
 
 
 
 
